Tactical Adaptions

Though this is a stand-alone piece it is also a follow up to Restattacke which can be read here.

Bayern Munich’s tactical adaption that fixed their rest defense and pulled apart RB Leipzig’s midfield and backline

Bayern’s players in the first half against Leipzig had a higher focus on positional rotations to unbalance the opponent opposed to focusing on creating positional superiorities. These positional rotations that were meant to unbalance the opponent weren’t as effective as they could have been due to Leipzig’s organized zonal pressing in a 5–2–3 formation rather than man marking and following the opponents’ movements. In such situations creating positional superiorities to overload the opponent in key areas is a better tactic to unbalance the opposition opposed to the heavy positional rotations the Bayern players were performing. These positional superiorities also provided a more stable rest defense structure against Leipzig’s counterattacks though there were still large spaces needed to be covered by the lone #6 of Bayern in this system.

In possession Bayern built up with three center backs and a #6 against Leipzig’s front three who positioned narrowly and for most parts of the match were passive against Bayern’s back three. In the first half of the match Bayern had issues in the defensive transition with their 3–1 rest defense. This was due partially to Bayern’s positional rotations and the #6 adapting to the movement of the other Bayern players around him. This caused him to be mis-positioned in Bayern’s transition moments on several occasions which Leipzig was able to exploit with some consistency. With the Bayern #6 out of position Leipzig were able to exploit the open spaces in front of the Bayern center backs through vertical dribbling and the positioning of their three forwards in both half spaces and the center during attacking transitions with vertical movement to threaten the space in behind Bayern’s backline.

Tactically Bayern adapted later in the second half to Leipzig’s 5–2–3 structure by focusing on the positional superiority of their attacking players against Leipzig’s zonal block. This did better to pull apart the Leipzig midfielders and backline in possession by overloading Leipzig’s two center mids and gave themselves a more stable structure for the defensive transition phases. To do this Bayern had the right and left attacking mids positioned on the outsides of the two Leipzig midfielders with the central attacking mid positioned between the two. This made it impossible for the Leipzig midfielders to cover all options in the middle. The wingbacks for Bayern on either side of the field were high and wide to help pin back and pull apart Leipzig’s backline. This made it difficult for the Leipzig wingbacks to help cover the central midfielders. If the wingbacks did step out to cover in the middle that opened the space in the backline to play into the Bayern wingbacks which forced the center backs to have to shift to cover and Leipzig’s backline was pulled apart. If the wingbacks stay connected in the backline that leaves a free man in the middle and Leipzig’s midfield gets pulled apart which subsequently pulls apart the Leipzig backline as they react and compensate to the situation.

In the first of these three scenes we have the rotations made by the Bayern players. The #6 drops into the backline which pushes the right center back higher. The central attacking mid initially drops into the #6 space then moves out to the left which triggers the movement of the left attacking mid into the center trying to get between the lines. The issue with this was that the Leipzig players didn’t really react to the movements. Instead, they held positionally and passed off players which meant the Bayern players didn’t open the spaces that they wanted. The only player who followed their mark was the right wingback of Leipzig who followed the left attacking mid into the center and ultimately intercepted the pass. With no one now occupying the center for Bayern, the Leipzig central midfielder was free to dribble into the open space while the forwards made vertical runs to exploit the space in behind.

In these three scenes we can see how Bayern tactically adapted and fixed their structural issues. We can also see how they managed to pull apart RB Leipzig’s backline using this positional superiority. Here we have the #6 on the ball with the three attacking midfielders for Bayern filling the left half space, the center, and the right half space. To compensate the left wingback for RB Leipzig has decided to step out of the backline and cover Bayern’s right attacking mid. This allows for the right wingback of Bayern to freely occupy the vacated space. With little pressure on the ball the #6 can play a big diagonal pass into the open wingback. With the Leipzig wingback pushed forward this forces the right center back to leave his position to apply pressure. The backline of Leipzig is now pulled apart and there are big spaces between the right center back and the central center back. As the Bayern wingback uses his opponent’s momentum in pressing against him, he is able to beat the pressing center back on the dribble inside forcing a chain reaction of the central center back having to leave his position. This then frees up the Bayern center forward who can run in behind with acres of space for the Bayern wingback to play the ball in behind.

In this scenario the central attacking mid drops in to receive and bounce the ball back to the center back. As the ball is then shifted to the left center back the left attacking mid uses this as a trigger to dismark and move into a passing lane to receive with the center mid of Leipzig following his movement. This opens the space in the middle for the central attacking mid to drive into after receiving a one touch layoff from the left attacking mid. With the wider positioning of the Bayern right attacking mid the right wingback for Bayern looks to tuck inside. As the opposite center mid for Leipzig is drawn to the ball carrier this leaves the right attacking mid in acres of space which draws out the Leipzig wingback upon receiving the ball. Once the wingback steps out this opens the space for the tucked in wingback of Bayern to move out to and receive which forces the Leipzig center back to shift over to cover which again pulls apart the backline of RB Leipzig.

How Many Midfielders Do We Need?

In his post-match press conference after Wolves beat Tottenham 2–0 the manager for Wolves, Bruno Lage, had some interesting comments on how he thinks in preparation for a match on how his side should set up. These questions and idea’s Lage presents fit with thoughts I had on how RB Leipzig could have adapted defensively to approach Bayern’s adaption and are beneficial considerations before and during any match.

Bruno Lage: “When we talk about the strategies and the plans, it’s about how many midfielders you can use today. So, in that game, if I have more wingers, I will start with just two midfielders and more wingers to put more in the key positions, and they can give me different movements. That’s why every time I prepare the game it’s about this: how many midfielders do we need, where I need to put my players the start position and after it becomes about the movement we’ve worked.”

Though his referencing in his post-match press conference is mostly about his Wolves sides attack, the question: “how many midfielders do we need?” goes into how one would also think and plan their defensive set up against an opponent. After listening to these comments and questions presented by Bruno Lage, it got me interested in taking a look at how Lage set up Wolves against Tottenham.

Wolves Analysis vs Tottenham

Wolves set up in a 3–5–2 with the ball and a 5–3–2 against with Tottenham playing in a 3–4–3. We can see already how Bruno Lage answers his question of “how many midfielders do we need?”. Tottenham set up with four in the midfield, so Bruno Lage set up his Wolves side with five. The three midfielders in a 5–3–2 allowed for better balanced protection of the center and half spaces. This gave Wolves flexibility and allowed them to control the space. Because of this Tottenham were able to play side to side across the field at times but struggled vertically. As well having the three midfielders while pressing allowed the wingbacks and center backs to step out with more confidence as there was more cover and tighter spaces compared to pressing with two midfielders in front which left bigger spaces to have to cover. The two forwards played asymmetrically with one being more central and the second playing on the left and popping up at times on the right. While pressing one forward would look to position themselves nearby in the half spaces to be used as an outlet to progress their counter while the other would mostly be positioned in the center and look to make diagonal and vertical runs to create space.

Here we see two almost identical situations where Tottenham play the ball out wide and look to make a run into depth. As the wingback for Wolves goes out to press the ball in the wide area the right midfielder tracks the runner in behind. Having the three midfielders allows for this tracking in behind while the other two cover the center. This also allows the center backs to stay in position better protecting the center of the field and not get pulled apart covering the wingbacks.

Just before a Wolves counter (see next set of pictures below) we can see the balance of their defensive structure in the 5–3–2 that allows for the midfielders to better cover the center and half spaces giving more security to the backline. We can also see the forward drifting in the spaces while Wolves press. This gives the outlet to progress the counterattack (restattacke).

Here the wolves counter by playing through their second forward who had drifted over to the right. He then lays off to a midfielder in support while the center forward starts making a diagonal run into the middle attracting three defenders and opening space on the right for the second forward to make a vertical run. All that was needed was a better pass and Wolves would have threatened in behind.

In this scene just before another counterattack we can again see the balance of Wolves defensive organization with the three Wolves midfielders protecting the center spaces as the wingback jumps out to press the opposition wingback and Wolves overload Tottenham 3v2 and 5v4 around the ball. As well, we can see the center forward this time positioned as an outlet to counter after ball win (see below).

Here we see as Wolves play through the center forward to counter with the wingback making a vertical run to get in behind the center back. On the opposite side of the field we can see the open space on the right created by the asymmetrical positioning of the forwards which creates this space to allow the right midfielder to run into.

Here the second forward has drifted to the left side as an outlet for when Wolves regain possession to start their counterattack. The vertical movement of the center forward drags his defender which opens space for the right midfielder to again run into.

Tactics: The Sum of Communication and Decision Making

To postlude the above and preface the below: with a focus on the tactics of teams, their strategies and adaptions implemented, I want to highlight several thoughts presented by the assistant coach of Borussia Dortmund, Rene Maric, from his 2021 and 2019 advent calendars that are important to consider when planning or looking at the tactical plans of a team or game. Asked about his thoughts on the misconception of tactics Maric’s response was that people think of tactics as a thoroughly pre-planned, opponent-oriented idea by the coach. However, for Maric, “tactics are the sum of communication and decision making made by the players.” This communication and decision making, Maric states, “is aided by the coaches who support and advise to improve the efficiency of the team.” He continues, “this should be apparent in the actions through principles used in the games through the use of a teams game model.” “This can then be further specified for specific situations that can potentially occur in a specific game.” “Some may call these ‘tactics’,” Maric states. “It is still the players on the field performing these actions, communicating collectively, and deciding individually as a team.” Rene Maric then states that tactics aren’t, nor can they be pre-scripted they can only be pre-advised and happen within each game’s situations.” “Winning isn’t a single action but a coincidence of collective actions just as tactics are the coincidence of the intentions and communication of decisions made by the collection of players,” Maric finishes.

In Rene Maric’s 2019 advent calendar on the future of tactics as the synthesis, or the combination of ideas to form a theory or system, as being more proactive and reactive he states he believes game plans will become “more and more similar over the next 50 years.” The differences being more nuanced using the example from the NBA of the variation’s teams use of the pick and roll. Rene Maric continues by saying “a lot of underlying strategies get used by most teams such as spacing.” He says, “every team wants to be compact, how they believe they can achieve this still differs” however he believes these differences will become smaller and become more about “when to be proactive and when to be passive.” For Maric, “the defending team sets the board, and the attacking team plays the game.” However, he states, “you can be proactive in any of the game phases and act with intention to create the specific situations that you want but this is harder to do when a team is attacking.” ‘Active’ for Maric would mean “following patterns with little regard to the situation.” ‘Reactive’ would then be “the reaction to the opposing patterns with ‘passive’ meaning no (re-)action at all.”

Hypothetical Group Stage Leg 2: Wolverhampton Wanders vs Bayern Munich

The adaptions made by a team or coach can happen in various ways from adapting game to game, making in game adaptions during live play as well as having flexibility in positions that can change depending on the situation. Looking at the setup of Bayern we want to ask ourselves firstly, as Bruno Lage asked prior to the Tottenham game, “how many midfielders do we need?” With the the three attacking midfielders and three attacking players in the last line pinning back five defenders it makes it difficult for one of the wingbacks or center backs to step out. Because of this it would then appear there is a need for three midfielders to match up against Bayern’s three. It would be different if Bayern lined up in say a 3–2–2–3. With a 5–2–3 the two midfielders could match up against the oppositions two and the three forwards could handle the two pivots. Even playing with two midfielders against a 3–2–3–2 would be possible with more flexibility for the defenders in the backline against two forwards allowing them to step out and cover/support the midfielders. The second question needed asked to set up the restattacke when looking to counter: “where is the space?” With just a single #6 holding for Bayern in front of the backline that opens lots of spaces in the center on either side of the #6. Add to that the large distance that is needed to be covered by the lone #6 it is possible to catch him out of position which leads to more central space that could be exploited. In pressing with two forwards, it’s possible to deal with the lone #6 by positioning on either side. The two forwards on either side of the #6 should also look to play asymmetrically and offset with one playing higher than the other. This cuts off diagonal passing lanes and allows access to the #6 and center back for the higher positioned forward and access to the #6 and midfielders for the deeper positioned forward. With the two forwards asymmetrical positioning it then leaves space for the flexibility of one of the midfielders depending on which side the forwards are lined up. This allows for the midfielder to step out to press the opposing center back while defending and opens the half space for the midfielder to exploit with forward runs on the counter.

From the previous hypothetical match up between Bayern Munich and Wolverhampton the adaption is made from a 5–2–3 to a 5–3–2 to deal with the positioning of the three Bayern attacking midfielders. The 5–2–3 zonal press from Leipzig was able to neutralize Bayern initially due to their positioning and the unnecessary movements the Bayern players were making with little benefit. Positional rotations work against man marking schemes because it draws the opponent out of space and positions to create space and weaken their defensive shape. Though this can destabilize the possession teams own shape leading to a lack of balance and poor positioning for transitions, the possession team has the upper hand as the opponent’s movement is reactionary to the possession teams. Too many positional rotations made against zonal marking systems fail due to the unnecessary movement that destabilizes the ball possessing teams shape while the opponent keeps its organization blocking off key space and passing off opponents as they move.

What happens if Bayern adapts with four midfielders? Say Bayern start playing in a 3–1–4–2 by dropping their wingbacks deeper and pushing one midfielder high to play as a second forward. How could this be handled? Depending, you could press in a 3–5–2 with both wingbacks high against the opposition wide players. This leaves a 3v2 at the back and an overload in the middle against the opposition with a 3v2. The issue can arise having the wingbacks so high and aggressive matching up to their counterpart it opens space in behind that can be exploited with runs and third man combinations which can then lead to the mis-positioning of our center backs as they get dragged out to cover these areas. To help elevate this issue the flexibility of the #6 is key. The #6 dropping into the backline to help cover when needed and to be able to step up into the midfield when one steps up to press and knowing when to do so is vital. Another option could be to play one wingback higher and the other in the backline to make a back four. This creates a 4v2 which provides more cover at the back and a match up in midfield 4v4. The questions also need to be asked: how fixed are these adaptions from the opponent (Bayern)? Is it only situational? Or a more permanent structural and positional change? Do we even need to adapt structurally? Flexibly? Or do we only need to adapt our movements and triggers and a slight variation of our positioning? How we adapt is dependent on the behavior of the opponent. From there it’s about movements and pressing triggers to track, cover, and close space.

The future of tactics: teams being more adaptable in and out of possession and game plans becoming more similar. Teams will be more comfortable and understand how to react and change out of different formations and systems depending on the situation and moment of the match. With teams and coaches asking more questions such as where are the spaces? How many midfielders do I need today? It gives a mindset of adaptability and flexibility to the needs of each game independently and dependent on how the opposition sets up in defense and attack and how the opponent adapts. From there teams will be quicker and more efficient in adapting to the adaptions of the opposition which will result in adaption after adaption and so on looking to gain an advantage, exploit space, close space, and stop progressions.

Here we have a look at wolves pressing in a zonal 5–3–2 against Bayern’s attacking 3–1–3–3 formation. The two forwards for Wolves positioned asymmetrical and offset blocks off the diagonal passing lanes into the center and helps set up their restattacke. Having the second forward positioned a bit deeper in the half space sets him as an outlet after a ball win. The center forward positioned centrally helps keep him better connected to the second forward with the job to make runs to create space and threaten in behind. The initial open space created from the asymmetrical positioning of the two forwards also allows the right mid space to run vertically into on the counter. Once positions and roles are set then we want to look for the pressing triggers.

If the ball gets circulated to the opposite side center back this is a trigger for the right-side midfielder to jump out to press. This action to press by the midfielder doesn’t often lead to a ball win directly but is used to put the receiving center back under pressure to allow less time on the ball and force a quicker decision that leads to a poor pass in a less advantageous area leading to a ball win. This pressing from the right midfielder as well keeps the center forward positioned centrally for counterattacks.

If the pass gets played out wide to the wingback dropping to receive or the attacking mid moving wide this triggers the press from the wingback while the Wolves midfielder looks to stay compact in the middle. As the pressing and shifting occur from the Wolves midfield and backline to keep the horizontal and vertical compactness the second forward drifts into the half spaces/wide areas to look to be an outlet in transition to start Wolves counterattack.

Once the ball is won the second forward is sought out in the half space to retain possession and progress the counterattack. The initial run from the center forward looks to create space by pinning the backline and forcing them to track his movement. The second vertical runs from the wingbacks and right midfielder look to provide progressive passing options for the second forward.

Here Bayern adapts by dropping the left sided midfielder into a deeper position next to the six to make a 3–2–2–3 box midfield. Wolves adapt by playing the right midfielder higher forming a 5–2–3 but with the offset positioning of the second and third forward in relation to the center forward it almost forms a 5–2–2–1. The deeper positioning of the forwards for Wolves gives access to the two holding midfielders of Bayern as well as the two attacking midfielders to be able to backpress. With the wider positioning of the center backs it makes it difficult for the outside passing lanes to be cut off without opening too many interior passing lanes. Because of this the two deeper forwards should look to block off the center and allow the outside passing lanes to be playable which triggers the press out wide from the wingback and ball side center mid. The restattacke gets set with the ball near forward orientating near the opponent midfielder looking to be an outlet, the center forward stays high between the 6 and the center backs looking to make vertical/wide runs to create space/options, the ball far forward positioned deeper in the opposite half space looks to be a secondary outlet in transition drifting into the center.

Training

Tactical Adaption Game 1: Decision Making

“Tactics are the sum of communication and decision making made by the players which is aided by the coaches who support and advise to improve the efficiency of the team.” -Rene Maric

This game has three phases. Each phase is played for two minutes with the changes from phase to phase being made in the flow of the game. This game is played for three sets with a two-minute break between each set. There should be four players, two for black and two for blue off to the side during the first phase waiting to join in phase two. From phase one to phase two and to phase three there will be players and rules added to create overloads/underloads with the idea for the players to be flexible and adapt to the situations. As has been stated tactics and adaptions are a result of the decision making from the players so in this first game in particular the focus will be on the players reading the play and making decisions accordingly. Into the second game below there will be a slightly bigger influence from the coach. For this game, the first phase is 7v7 plus a keeper for black with light blue attacking the big goal and black attacking the two small goals. The even numbered teams means there should be lots of match ups between players across the field blurring the line for what the players positions are as they move and rotate positions all over the field looking to create and exploit space. The second phase the two blues are added to the playing field with one added to the playing field for black. The other player for black gets added as a target player who black needs to play into before scoring. This creates an overload/underload that the players must react to. The underloaded team particularly needs to look to structure and organize themselves defensively with players operating in more specific spaces/positions and more ball and space orientations in their movement and pressing. The third phase adds the target player to the playing field with both teams attacking big goals with keepers. Now as the game becomes a 9v9 with keepers both teams need to decide on the behavior in how they will attack and defend. With even numbers players could look to match up but with the bigger area there is more space that can be exploited.

Tactical Adaption Game 2: Structural Changes

In this second game the teams are set up in certain formations which can vary depending on a team’s principles and the opposition they face. Like the game above there are three phases to this game. Each phase is played for three minutes with a two-minute rest between sets and playing a total of three sets. For the first three minutes the first phase of this game black is set up in a 4–3–1 and blue in a 3–3–2. The next three minutes in the second phase blue pushes players forward to create a 2–2–4 attacking structure. This forces the black team to adapt into a 5–2–1. The last three minutes for the third phase see’s blue drop the two wide players deeper in possession to form a 2–4–2 which black then adapt to with a 3–4–1 to match up in midfield. Again, what formations and adaptions that get chosen can vary based on a team’s principles and opponents. In different formations for example you may want the winger to attack on the inside or the outside depending on the space and set up of the formation and the opposition. If in one formation the winger is more isolated 1v1 then he could attack on the outside. If in another formation the space is more compact and the opposition has cover then look to attack on the inside to create more passing connections and draw out defenders. Same defensively, in one formation you may want to force play to the outside when pressing and in another formation you may want to force to the inside. It is up to the coach to communicate these details to the players. Though the coach in this game has a larger influence on the structure that each side plays and adapts into, the success is still up to the communication and decision making of the players which should be based on the team’s game model and principles. From here we could add rules to create in game adaptions to influence the behaviors of the attacker/defenders by awarding extra points if executed. For example, winning the ball back within a certain amount of time (i.e., six seconds) to facilitate pressing quicker. Another option could be extra points for scoring within a certain amount of time after winning the ball back (i.e., eight seconds) to get teams attacking quicker to score. You could also add extra points for completing X number of passes before a goal (i.e., ten passes) to promote a slower build up. Lastly, you could add extra points for attacking through certain channels or areas to promote attacking through the wings or central attacks. These should not be strict rules but options to the players/teams to allow them to attack and defend with different solutions depending on the situations.

KW

Written February 2022

https://twitter.com/sakshamkakkar24/status/1493603839043416070?s=21

https://twitter.com/ReneMaric/status/1474787819948232704?s=20&t=fpyXVTKUh4J50e5K1gvCqA

https://twitter.com/ReneMaric/status/1209399201030909953?s=20&t=Ei_NIYNmMeCtHMtWHudrsQ